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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
opments in New York Practice section in the October Survey of this
volume; a sequel appeared in the last Survey.
Other cases of special significance include Caton v. Caton, where
the court held that the failure to publish a summons within twenty
days after the granting of the order of publication is a jurisdictional
defect; Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, wherein the Fourth Department
allowed disclosure against a nonparty witness where it would aid prep-
aration for trial; Zellman v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
which holds that the names of eyewitnesses, even if obtained by investi-
gation, are discoverable if they are material and necessary; Rubino v.
G. D. Searle & Co., wherein the court allowed the videotaping of a pre-
trial examination; and Phillips v. Joseph Kantor & Co., in which the
Court of Appeals allowed consideration of evidence excludable under
the dead man's statute to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Additionally, under article 31, the trend toward allowing discovery
and inspection of the defendant's automobile liability insurance policy
is considered. Under article 11, the Court of Appeals' answer to the
question as to whether the state or local government is responsible for
indigents' publication costs in matrimonial actions is presented.
The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which are
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's pro-
cedural law. Due to space limitations, many other less important, but,
nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included. While few cases are
exhaustively discussed, it is hoped that the Survey accomplishes its basic
purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to significant developments in the
procedural law of New York.
ARTcILE 2- LIMITATONS OF TmE
CPLR 214(6): First Department rejects extension of discovery rule to
attorney malpractice.
Generally, the three-year statute of limitations prescribed by CPLR
214(6) for malpractice actions begins to run at the time of injury." Two
exceptions to this rule have been created. Borgia v. City of New York 2
established the "continuous treatment" doctrine, whereby the accrual
of a malpractice cause of action is delayed until the services of the phy-
sician for the same or related injuries terminate. Flanagan v. Mount
I Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 NE.2d 142, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241
N.Y.S. 529 (lst Dep't), aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930).
2 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962); accord, O'Laughlin v.
Salamanca Hosp. Dist. Authority, 36 App. Div. 2d 51, 319 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dep't 1971).
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Eden General Hospita3 established a discovery rule for medical mal-
practice cases where a foreign object is left in the patient's body; ac-
crual of the cause of action is postponed until the plaintiff could rea-
sonably have discovered the injury.4 In Siegel v. Kranis,5 the Appellate
Division, Second Department, applied the "continuous treatment" doc-
trine to attorney malpractice.
In Gilbert Properties, Inc. v. Millstein,6 the Appellate Division,
First Department, rejected an extension of the discovery rule to attor-
ney malpractice. The plaintiff had lost a cause of action because its at-
torney, having failed to search the title record, did not proceed against
the true owner of the building that had collapsed and damaged its
property in 1963. The plaintiff replaced the attorney in 1966; the error
was discovered upon the 1969 reversal of a judgment in its favor. After
the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against the attorney in 1970,
the appellate division ultimately sustained the defense of the statute of
limitations, holding that the cause of action had accrued when the at-
torney sued the wrong parties.
" '[T]he statutory period of limitations begins to run,'" the court
stated, "'from the time when liability for wrong has arisen even though
the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or in-
jury.' "7 It further reasoned that to extend the foreign object exception
to attorney malpractice would be too radical a departure from the tradi-
tional view for an intermediate appellate court to formulate,8 adding
324 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 500, 508 (1971).
4 The Flanagan discovery rule, initially limited to foreign object malpractice cases, was
extended to a malpractice action for the breaking of a prosthetic device placed in the
plaintiff's hip four years earlier. Murphy v. St. Charles Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 64, 312
N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 500,
507 (1971). More recently, the discovery rule was applied to an injury caused to the
plaintiff's pancreas during an operation for the removal of his spleen and discovered four
years later. Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 App. Div. 2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743 (4th Dep't 1972),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 148, 153 (1972).
5 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1968). See Marine Midland Trust
Co. v. Penberthy, De Iorio & Rayhill, 60 Misc. 2d 11, 301 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. Oneida
County 1969).
640 App. Div. 2d 100, 338 N.Y.S.2d 370 (lst Dep't 1972).
7 Id. at 105, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75, quoting Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp.
Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300, 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936). The dissent, however, relied on Siegel v.
Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1968), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 302, 306 (1968), arguing that the plaintiff's malpractice cause
of action did not accrue until its attorney's error resulted in an unfavorable judgment
against it. 40 App. Div. 2d at 106, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
8 40 App. Div. 2d at 104, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 373, citing Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint
Diseases, 36 App. Div. 2d 81, 3, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676-77 (2d Dep't 1971), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 147, 151 (1971) (misdiagnosis of ailment not
equated with foreign object malpractice).
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that even if the exception applied, the alleged error in this case was
readily discoverable by the plaintiff or its new attorneys.9
Although a discovery rule for attorney malpractice would ap-
parently not have aided the plaintiff in Gilbert, it would promote fair-
ness in cases where there has been substantial delay before an attorney's
malpractice could reasonably have been discovered.' 0
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTION AND SERVICE,
APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 316(c): Failure to publish summons within twenty-day statutory
period deemed a jurisdictional defect.
The CPLR, consistent with its policy of liberal construction," per-
mits the court to correct a mistake or irregularity at any stage of an ac-
tion provided that there is no substantial prejudice to the rights of op-
posing pardes.' 2 Although courts have differentiated curable irregu-
larities from incurable jurisdictional defects, no general standard has
emerged from this classification. 13
In Gaton v. Caton,14 the Supreme Court, Monroe County, ad-
dressed itself to the irregularity-jurisdictional defect dichotomy as it ap-
plied to service by publication of a summons in a divorce action.
Therein, the first publication was not made within twenty days after
the granting of the order of publication as required by CPLR 316(c). 15
In holding the defect to be jurisdictional and dismissing the complaint,
the court distinguished mere irregularities in service by publication 0
from jurisdictional defects in the manner or time of publication.1 7
9 40 App. Div. 2d at 104-05, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 373-74.
10 There is something profoundly distressing in the notion that a cause of action
may become time-barred even before the plaintiff knew or could, as a reasonable
man, have known about its existence. There may even be a due process question.
7B McKsNNEY'S CPLR 214, commentary at 437 (1972). Cf. Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d
272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968). But see Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 218-19, 188 N.E.2d 142, 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719, cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963).
11 CPLR 104.
12 CPLR 2001.
13 Valz v. Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp., 249 N.Y. 122, 134, 163 N.E. 124, 128, cert.
denied, 278 U.S. 647 (1928).
14 72 Misc. 2d 544, 339 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1972).
15 Service was made by publication, but the first publication was three days late.
16 Lambert v. Lambert, 270 N.Y. 422, 1 N.E.2d 833 (1936) (failure to timely file the
order of publication is curable by a nunc pro tunc order); Winter v. Winter, 256 N.Y.
113, 175 N.E. 533 (1931) (failure to file proof of service before judgment is an irregularity);
Valz v. Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp., 249 N.Y. 122, 163 N.E. 124, cert. denied, 278
U.S. 647 (1928) (publication of summons in a newspaper different from the one named in
the order of publication may be cured by amendment of order nunc pro tunc); Mishkind-
Feinberg Realty Co. v. Sidorsky, 189 N.Y. 402, 82 NE. 448 (1907).
17 72 Misc. 2d at 545, 339 N.Y.S2d at 94, citing Doheny v. Worden, 75 App. Div. 47,
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